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HOUSE  CONCURRENT  Resolution  133,  passed  in  March  1975, requires 
that 
...  the Board  of Governors  shall consult  with Congress  at semi-annual  hearings 
before the Committee  on Banking,  Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate 
and the Committee  on Banking,  Currency  and Housing  of the House of Repre- 
sentatives  about the Board of Governors'  and the Federal  Open Market  Com- 
mittee's  objectives  and plans  with respect  to the ranges  of growth  or diminution 
of monetary  and credit  aggregates  in the upcoming  twelve  months ..  .1 
The Federal Reserve has responded by setting targets for four different 
variables: M1, M2, M3, and the bank-credit proxy.2 (The proxy was later 
dropped from the list.) The first set of one-year targets covered the period 
from March 1975 to March 1976, while the second, third, and fourth sets 
were defined in terms of the growth of the quarterly  average of the targeted 
variables from the second, third, and fourth quarters of  1975 to the cor- 
responding quarters of  1976. The purpose of  this report is  to  analyze 
initial experience with this targeting procedure. 
The first and second sections outline the features and problems of the 
present  targeting  procedures, and the third examines the operational signifi- 
cance  of  the  announced targets. An  alternative method  of  expressing 
monetary targets is suggested next, and the final section offers a few com- 
ments on the possibility, suggested by some, of adding interest-rate  targets 
to the present system. 
1. Conduct  of Monetary  Policy, Conference  Report to Accompany  H. Con. Res. 133, 
Rept. 94-91, 94:1 (Government  Printing  Office,  1975), p. 1. 
2. For definitions  of these monetary  aggregates,  see table 1, note c. 
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Table  1. Growth  Targets  of Money  and  Credit  Measures,  and  Actual 
Growth,  Various  Periods,  March  1975-Fourth  Quarter  1976 
Percent  change  at annual  rates 
Monetary  measure0 
Intervala  and type  ojfgrowthb  Ml  M2  M3  Credit  proxy 
March  1975-March  1976 
Target  5-7.5  8.5-10.5  10-12  6.5-9.5 
Actual  5.0  9.4  12.1  3.3 
1975:2-1976:2 
Target  5-7.5  8.5-10.5  10-12  6.5-9.5 
Actuald  4.4  9.0  11.6  3.2 
1975:3-1976:3 
Target  5-7.5  7.5-10.5  9-12  e 
Actuald  3.2  8.3  10.6  ... 
1975:4-1976:4 
Target  4.5-7.5  7.5-10.5  9-12 
Actuald  3.8  9.8  11.3  ... 
Sources: Targets, Federai  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 61 (May 1975), p. 286; (August 1975), p. 495; (November 
1975), p. 747, and vol. 62 (February 1976), p. 124. Actual, ibid. (April 1976), p. 12, and Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release H.6, May 6, 1976. 
a.  On May 1, 1975, the targets for March 1975 to March 1976 were announced; on Jlly  24, 1975, for 
1975:2 to  1976:2; on November 4, 1975, for  1975:3 to  1976:3; and on Februiary  3, 1976, for 1975:4 to 
1976:  4. 
b. The actual growth rates are calculated frorm  seasonally adjusted data. 
c.  Ml consists of demand deposits at commercial banks plus currency  in circulation; M2  is Ml plus savings 
and time deposits at commercial banks othier  than large-denomination negotiable certificates of  deposit; 
MI is M2 plus deposits at mutual savings banks, savings and loan shares, and credit union shares; the credit 
proxy is total member-bank deposits subject to reserve requirements, plus Eurodollar borrowings, loans 
sold to bank-related  institutions, and certain other nondeposit items. 
d. Actual growth rate from base quarter to March 1976, the latest information available at time of this 
writing. 
e.  Not targeted. 
In the discussion  below, I have attempted  to avoid all issues  of the de- 
sirability  of House  Concurrent  Resolution  133,  as well as general  issues  of 
Federal Reserve independence. The relative merits of various monetary 
aggregates as policy targets will not be examined-the  use of M1 rather 
than M2 or M3  in the figures  reflects  expositional  convenience  only-and 
finally, except for a few comments in the last section, the advisability of 
monetary targets rather than interest-rate targets will not be discussed. 
I do discuss  issues  concerning  the comprehensibility  of announced  tar- 
gets to the Congress and the general public. Whatever the political merits 
of House Concurrent  Resolution 133, the mechanism should not be vulner- 
able to confusion caused by correctable  defects in the way monetary targets 
are  expressed  and explained  by the Federal  Reserve. William Poole  249 
Present  Monetary-Targeting  Procedures 
Table  1 summarizes  the targets  and  experience  to date  with  the quarterly 
procedure  initiated  in 1975.  According  to the preliminary  data available 
for March  1976,  the M1  and M2  targets  for March  1976  were  met, M3  ran 
a whisker  above its target  range,  and the credit  proxy fell well below its 
range.  The  second,  third,  and  fourth  target  announcements  pertain  to dates 
still in the future  at the time of this writing;  hence, for each of these 
periods,  the entries  in the table present  the actual growth  rates from the 
base quarters  to March 1976,  and may be viewed  as "progress  reports." 
An examination  of the table  raises  a question:  Why  was the first  target 
range  of M1  met and yet, according  to the progress  reports,  M1 growth 
subsequently  fell below  the target  ranges? 
Figure  1 provides  the answer  to this question.  In the figure  each  vertical 
bar shows  the target  range  in the level of M1, calculated  by applying  the 
target  growth  range to the base level shown at the apex of each cone- 
like figure,  which in turn is formed  by connecting  the ends of the bars 
to the base level.3  Only  the vertical  bars  themselves  should  be considered 
the targets,  but a comparison  of actual  M1  to the cones  visualizes  the prog- 
ress reports.  Since  the money stock has not remained  on the axes of the 
cones defined  by earlier  announcements,  the base level underlying  each 
new announcement-and  therefore  the target  range  for one year  ahead  in 
terms  of the level of M1-has to some extent  been inconsistent  with pre- 
viously  announced  targets. 
The Fed has defined  targets  for other  aggregates  in the same  way as for 
M1, and therefore  the problem  illustrated  by figure 1 is not confined  to 
that aggregate.  To date the inconsistencies  have been smaller  for M2  and 
M3  than for M1,  but they need not remain  so in the future. 
Problems  with  the Current  Procedures 
The current  targeting  procedure  has two defects, one major and the 
other minor. The major one is the probability  of generating  successive 
3. Since the second, third, and fourth announcements  defined targets in terms of 
quarterly  averages,  the vertical bars have been placed at the middle months of the 
quarters  for these targets. 0>  ~~~~~~~  c 
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targets that either are inconsistent or represent  inadvertent  departures  from 
(more or less) steady growth paths desired by policymakers. This problem 
is illustrated by the apparently haphazard relationship of the successive 
cones in figure 1. The minor defect is the potential for inconsistency among 
targets for multiple variables. 
INCONSISTENCIES IN  BASE LEVELS 
Defining monetary targets as the Fed has been doing is, I believe, un- 
fortunate. Short-run  fluctuations in the money stock may be desirable, or 
unavoidable, or both, but ought not to be automatically built into targets 
for one year ahead. 
The  economic  arguments supporting this  position  can  be  explained 
readily. It is generally agreed that monetary fluctuations have effects on em- 
ployment, prices, and so on that are distributed  over time. If, for example, 6 
percent growth in money is desirable,  most economists will agree that 8 per- 
cent growth for one quarter followed by 4 percent growth the next will 
affect GNP and the other variables very much as would two quarters of 
steady 6 percent growth. If, however, an 8 percent quarter is followed by 
a string of 6 percent quarters,  then, as the distributed-lag  effects are worked 
out, the "extra" money growth of the 8 percent quarter will have an in- 
fluence on the economy. Many economists would expect this unreversed 
extra growth to lower unemployment temporarily and eventually to raise 
the price level permanently above what it otherwise would have been.4 
Moreover, the economy's response to monetary fluctuations may depend 
in part on the views held in the private sector about the Fed's monetary 
strategy. If the public believes that short-run monetary fluctuations will be 
reversed, the impact of those fluctuations on the economy is likely to be 
small; if these fluctuations are not reversed, especially if  they continue 
4. Put more precisely,  a reduced-form  equation  explaining  unemployment  by money 
growth  would have a fairly  long distributed  lag with negative  early  lag coefficients,  posi- 
tive later  ones, and either  a zero sum of the coefficients  (vertical  long-run  Phillips  curve) 
or, possibly,  a somewhat  positive sum. Similarly,  the reduced-form  explanation  of the 
inflation  rate by the growth  rate of the money stock has a distributed  lag whose coeffi- 
cients  sum  to one. Other  things  equal,  a quarter  with 2 percentage  points of extra  money 
growth  that is not reversed  in subsequent  quarters  will affect unemployment  and prices 
over time as indicated  in the example  in the text. If the extra  money growth  is reversed, 
the effects on unemployment  and prices will be limited to the differenzces  between the 
distributed-lag  coefficients  for adjacent  quarters;  these differences  will be small if the 
distributed-lag  patterns  are, as usually  assumed,  reasonably  smooth. 252  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
quarter  after  quarter  in the same  direction,  the speed  of the  response  of the 
private  economy  eventually  will change  as households  and firms  come to 
expect  these  continuations  rather  than  reversals. 
Monetary  fluctuations  arising  from transitory  financial-market  distur- 
bances  and  data  and  control  errors  are  caused  by factors  that  are  by defini- 
tion "temporary"-short-lived  relative  to the length  of the distributed-lag 
effects  of money  on the economy.  A "permanent"  change  in conditions- 
a change  enduring  relatively  long compared  with distributed-lag  effects- 
may  well  call  for  a change  in monetary  targets.  However,  the  present  target- 
ing procedure,  by defining  targets  one year  ahead  in terms  of growth  rates 
on bases equal to actual levels of the money stock, implicitly  treats  all 
short-run  monetary  fluctuations  as responses  to permanent  changes. 
The  quantitative  importance  of this  issue  for  interpreting  the Fed's  mone- 
tary  targets  is most easily  examined  in the context  of data  revisions.  These 
are readily  observable  and measurable,  whereas  control errors  and the 
Fed's  deliberate  responses  to temporary  factors  are not because  the Fed's 
intentions  are not. As an example,  the first  statement  of one-year  targets 
on May 1, 1975,  included,  among  other  data,  the March  1975  level of M1, 
reported  to be $286.8  billion.  As of this writing,  however,  M1 for March 
1975-after a series of downward  revisions  reported  in the issues of the 
Federal Reserve  Bulletin  for June  and October  1975  and February  1976- 
is reported  to be $284.1  billion,  or 1.0  percent  below  the original  estimate; 
a revision  of this size is not trivial  relative  to a target  growth  range  for Ml 
that is 2.5 percentage  points  wide. 
Revisions  of this magnitude  are  by no means  uncommon,  and while  the 
Fed has always  emphasized  data  problems  in the abstract,  it has offered  no 
guidance-in the quarterly  hearings  or elsewhere-on how such revisions 
should  affect  the interpretation  of the targets.  Because  of all the technical 
detail  involved,  the Fed will  find  it particularly  awkward  to explain  a situa- 
tion in which data revisions  alter  estimates  for adjacent  base quarters  in 
opposite  directions,  producing  target  levels for adjacent  quarters  that are 
highly  inconsistent  (in the sense  relevant  to economic  policy). 
MULTIPLE TARGETS 
The  current  practice  of targeting  three  different  variables  raises  relatively 
minor  issues  since  the variables-Ml, M2,  and M3--are  highly  correlated. 
However,  any question  abo-ut  the accuracy  of the Fed's aim can be an- William  Poole  253 
swered  unambiguously  only when  the target  ranges  for all three  are hit or 
they are all missed.  Moreover,  should all three  target  ranges  be missed, 
but some on the high side and others  on the low, it might  be argued  that 
the Fed did not "really"  miss its announced  targets.  Indeed,  if the differ- 
ential growth  rates among the targeted  variables  are not what the Fed 
expected,  it probably  makes  good sense  for the policymakers  to aim above 
some  and below others. 
The major  problem  with multiple  targets,  in my opinion, is that the 
greater  the number,  the greater  the possibility  that  the targeting  procedure 
will lose meaning.  With only one target  variable,  the Fed would  be under 
greater  pressure  either  to hit that target  or to provide  persuasive  reasons 
for missing.  The convenience  of the opportunity  to hit by chance  one of 
many  targets  invites  indecision  and delay  in either  hitting  the primary  tar- 
get or marshaling  evidence  to justify  the miss. Finally,  with  many  targets, 
the Federal  Reserve  finds it much easier  to discuss  its policy publicly  in 
terms  of a mass  of technical  detail  and  to rationalize  the addition  or elimi- 
nation of variables  from the targeted  set. The credit  proxy,  for example, 
was dropped  as a target variable  with no mention whatsoever  in the 
November  4, 1975,  announcement  of targets.5 
SIGNIFICANCE  OF THESE  PROBLEMS 
The issues  examined  above are important  for two reasons.  House Con- 
current  Resolution  133  presumably  was designed  to increase  congressional 
influence  over monetary  policy, in part by providing  regular  quarterly 
hearings  for congressional  comment  on Federal  Reserve  plans.  If that was 
the congressional  intent, the present  ambiguities  in the definitions  of the 
targets, which invite confusion and misunderstanding,  surely do  not 
further  it. Second, the Federal  Reserve  has devised a targeting  system 
under  which  targets  for several  variables  will from  time to time be incon- 
sistent  and, worse  yet, targets  for the same  variable  in successive  quarters 
will from  time to time be inconsistent  if the successive  targets  are meant 
5. An explanation  of the reasons for dropping  the credit proxy should have been 
provided.  Immediately  following the quotation  at the beginning  of this report,  H. Con. 
Res. 133 says that "nothing  in this resolution  shall be interpreted  to require  that such 
ranges  of growth  or diminution  be achieved  if the Board of Governors  and the Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  determine  that they cannot or should not be achieved  because 
of changing  conditions.  The Board  of Governors  shall  report  to the Congress  the reasons 
for any such determination  during  the next hearings  held pursuant  to this resolution." 254  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
to  hold  simultaneously. That monetary targeting need  not  entail these 
problems is shown below, in my discussion of an alternative procedure. 
Operational  Significance  of the Announced  Targets 
In the four statements to date announcing targets, the Federal Reserve 
has adopted almost identical target growth rates, apparently reflecting the 
beliefs that unchanged money growth rates reflect unchanged policy and 
that no policy change has been needed. For example, the July statement 
contained this passage: 
Economic  prospects  now are not materially  different  than the Federal  Reserve 
anticipated  2 or 3 months ago, and we therefore  as yet see no reason to alter 
the general  course of monetary  policy. Accordingly,  the Federal  Open Market 
Committee  has reaffirmed  its intent  to seek  the growth  ranges  announced  earlier.6 
But the Fed has also emphasized that short-run monetary control is very 
imprecise  and that the one-year target growth rates do not necessarily  imply 
comparable targets over shorter intervals. By reporting unchanged targets 
for growth rates-rather  than levels-of  the money stock, the Fed's an- 
nouncements incorporate no provision for reversing abnormally high or 
low money growth over short periods and therefore are not in fact con- 
sistent with hitting the longer-run targets. 
Since the Fed has emphasized that the targets for money growth are not 
to be interpreted as implying comparable targets over short periods, and 
since the procedure incorporates short-run monetary fluctuations into the 
target levels, the question is whether the Fed's open market operations will 
be designed to reverse short-run surges or shortfalls of money growth, or 
whether the new targets announced every quarter will in fact supersede 
previously announced targets. There is yet too little experience to suggest 
which course the Fed will choose.  But in the particular case of the an- 
nouncement on February 3, 1976, the market apparently accepted the latter 
interpretation of Fed  response to  the relatively slow  M1 growth in the 
second half of  1975-2.7  percent annual rate, June to December. Before 
February  3, the money markets had been expecting the Fed to push interest 
6. "Statement  by Arthur  F. Burns, Chairman,  Board of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve  System,  before the Committee  on Banking,  Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. 
House of Representatives,  July 24, 1975,"  in Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 61 (August 
1975),  p. 495. William Poole  255 
rates down; when the Fed reduced the minimum target growth rate for 
M1 from 5 to 4.5 percent, money-market rates rose. 
My prediction is that, for the most part, the Fed will tend to adjust the 
money stock to stay within the original target range. With three aggregates 
targeted, the target for  one rather than its level might be  adjusted-a 
quite sensible action since available evidence gives no strong reason for 
favoring one over another. But I find it difficult to believe that the Fed 
would risk a situation in which all of its target variables might fall signifi- 
cantly below  (above) their originally projected and publicly announced 
target ranges at a time when the economy might in retrospect prove to 
have been weak (strong). 
An Alternative  Method of Expressing Targets 
for Monetary  Aggregates 
The problems with the current procedures could be largely avoided by 
expressing  the targets for M1, M2, and Ms as illustrated for M1 in figure 2. 
In this figure, the most recently available official data on M1 are plotted 
as a series of points. 
The solid trend line starts at the actual 1975:1 average for M1, with a 
growth rate of  61/4 percent, the midpoint of the original 5-71/2 percent 
targets.7 The 5-71/2  percent targets were announced three times, and so 
the 61/4  percent trend line is simply extended out to  1976:3, still using the 
original 1975:1  base, rather than the actual money stock in the "new" base 
quarter. 
The  M1  targets  announced  February  3,  1976,  were  41/2-71/2  percent 
growth, with a midpoint of 6 percent. A vertical bar is drawn in the middle 
of 1976:3, the last quarter  to which the 61/4  percent midpoint target applies. 
The new 6 percent midpoint target rate produces a path starting from a 
base level defined by the old target path for the money stock rather than 
by the actual 1975:4 average money stock. The 6 percent path, of course, 
gradually diverges from the old 61/4  percent path. Each time the 6 percent 
target is renewed, the 6 percent trend line will be extended and the vertical 
bar drawn three months further into the future. 
7. The careful  eye may note that this trend line has a slight upward  curvature  since 
it was constructed  by applying  the money growth  rate with quarterly  compounding  that 
is equal  to 61/4  percent  with annual  compounding. cl  0 
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The band defined  by the dashed  lines in the figure  is a suggested  rein- 
terpretation  of the target  range.  The present  4'/2-71/2 percent  range  may 
be viewed  as a level four quarters  away equal to 1.06 times the current 
level,  plus or minus  0.015 of that level. In figure  2, the dashed  bands  are 
drawn  I  1/2 percentage  points  above  and below  the target  path represented 
by the solid line. The width  of the band  in November  1976  represents  the 
same dollar spread  (except  for a very minor difference  due to different 
base  levels)  as the width  of the cone for November  1976  in figure  1. The 
band  width  has been selected  in this way in order  that the suggested  pro- 
cedure  correspond  as closely as possible  to the current  procedure  in the 
amount  of leeway  the Federal  Reserve  believes  appropriate  in selecting 
one-year  targets  for money  growth. 
Under the suggested  procedure  the Federal  Reserve  would present  its 
targets  for the growth of monetary  aggregates  not in terms of a range 
but  in terms  of one number  defining  the central  growth  trend  and  a second 
number  defining  band limits as percentages  of the level of the aggregate 
around  the central  growth  trend.8  By presenting  charts  such as figure  2, 
the Fed would  direct  the public's  attention  to the level of the money  stock 
within  the  band  instead  of actual  rates  for  money  growth  over  short  periods 
of time.  For example,  as of this writing,  the March  1976  level of M1  would 
be viewed  as being  somewhat  above  the lower  band  rather  than  as having 
risen  in the last six months  at the relatively  low rate of only 3.3 percent 
per  year.  This  approach  would  also make  it easy  to provide  a feel for data 
errors.  Each  observation  of the money  stock  could  be presented  as a short 
bar  representing  the point estimate  plus and minus  the estimated  standard 
error. 
General  Comments  on Interest-Rate  Targeting 
Although  economists  differ  on the desirability  of announced-and un- 
announced-monetary  targets,  they generally  agree that it is technically 
feasible  to hold a particular  definition  of the money stock within  a band 
8. The language  of House Concurrent  Resolution 133 seems  to require  disclosure  of 
target  growth  rates  based on actual  base-period  data for the money stock. These  targets 
should be obtained  by calculation  from the actual base level to the ends of the target 
range  one year  ahead  defined  by the band  in figure  2. When  base-period  data  are  revised, 
the previously  announced  target growth rates would be revised by redoing the above 
calculation  rather  than automatically  revising  the target  levels for one year ahead. 258  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
as defined  in figure  2. Disturbances  may make it undesirable  to hold a 
money-stock  variable  within such a band, but are unlikely  to make it 
impossible to do so. Of course, it may not be possible to keep several 
different  monetary  variables  within  predetermined  bands. 
Interest-rate  targeting  is another  matter. If interest-rate  targets  were 
announced-with or without accompanying  monetary  targets-missing 
them  would  be the rule rather  than the exception  unless  the target  bands 
were  very  wide.  An attempt  to hold a particular  interest  rate  in a relatively 
narrow  band  when  market  pressures  tend  to push  it outside  is cumulatively 
destabilizing.  Interest-rate  pegging  was abandoned  after  World  War  II not 
simply  because  it was  undesirable  but  because  it was  infeasible.  The  market 
forces  that destroyed  the interest-peg  policy did act slowly-surprisingly 
so, in my opinion-but they  now operate  much  more  rapidly.  Under  pres- 
ent conditions,  an announced  one-year  target  for interest  rates  would  have 
to be abandoned  every  quarter,  and in fact ordinarily  would  not last even 
through  a quarter. 
Short-run  interest-rate  targets  for short-term  securities  could be an- 
nounced  and  achieved  most of the time,  but would  cause  constant  trouble. 
If publicly  committed  to an interest-rate  range,  the Federal  Reserve  would 
be blamed,  much more than at present,  for increases  in interest  rates, 
since they would reflect  either failure  to hold to announced  targets  or 
deliberate  and announced  changes  in targets.  Though  confined  to short- 
term securities,  targets  would nevertheless  affect the long-term  market, 
where  capital  losses from  rate  increases  can be substantial. 
If Fed policy  is linked  directly  and immediately  to the capital  gains  and 
losses experienced  by bondholders,  great  pressure  will be mobilized  for 
political  decisionmaking  in these tax- and subsidy-like  policy actions-a 
process  involving  public  debate  and the more or less formal  approval  of 
policy  changes  by elected  public  officials. 
During this political  decisionmaking  process,  market  reactions  antici- 
pating  interest-rate  changes  would make it more difficult  to achieve  tar- 
gets,  and  political  reactions  after  policy  changes  would  make  it more  diffi- 
cult  to change  future  targets.  On the other  hand,  it is feasible  to determine 
money-stock  targets  through  the political  process.  Changes  in the money 
stock do not have unambiguous  effects  on the direction  of interest-rate 
changes,  and delay in changing  the rate of money growth  is not cumula- 
tively  destabilizing. 
In summary,  a precondition  for announced  policy targets-in the sense William  Poole  259 
of targets  for variables  under  the control  of the policymakers  rather  than 
in the sense  of goals  for variables  like employment  or inflation-is that  the 
targets  be achievable.  If announced  monetary-policy  targets  are viewed  as 
desirable  for some  combination  of reasons  involving  the accountability  of 
public  officials  and  the  provision  of information  to improve  the functioning 
of private  markets,  those  targets  must  involve  monetary  magnitudes  rather 
than  interest  rates.  If a formal  procedure  of announced  targets  for interest 
rates  is introduced,  the effects  of the procedure  are certain  to be harmful 
and the system  is likely  to be short-lived. 